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ralHistories represent the recollections
and opinions of the person interviewed,
and not the official position of MORS.
Omissions and errors in fact are corrected when
possible, but every effort is made to present the
interviewee’s own words.
Mr. Bruce F. Powers worked in the
Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) from
1961 to 1978 and was Head of the Navy
Strategic, Affordability, and Readiness
Assessment Branches (in series) in the
Pentagon from 1994 to 2001. The inter-
view was conducted May 13, 2015 on
Bruce’s pontoon boat on Lake Barcroft
in Northern Virginia.
MORS ORAL HISTORY
Interview with Mr. Bruce F. Powers;
Dr. BobSheldon,FS,andMr.MikeGarrambone,
Interviewers.
Bob Sheldon: This is May 13, 2015, and
we’re here for aMORS oral history interview
with Bruce Powers, and we’re on beautiful
Lake Barcroft in Northern Virginia. Bruce,
first of all, can you state your full name, birth
date and location?
Bruce Powers: My full name is Bruce
Frank Powers, and I was born 14 December
1938 in Chicago, Illinois.
Bob Sheldon: Please give us your parents’
names?
Bruce Powers: My father was Frank
Powers.MymotherwasLucilleHankermeyer.
Bob Sheldon: Tell us a little bit about your
parents and how they influenced you.
Bruce Powers: My parents had a crucial
influence on me but, unfortunately, my fa-
ther died when I was seven, so my mother
became the more important parent then, al-
though she remarried later. (I had a stepfa-
ther, who was a benevolent fellow. It wasn’t
like having a real father.) So my mother was
the strongest influence on my young life.
Bob Sheldon:Howdid she influence you?
Bruce Powers:Basically, teachingme to be
responsible, dowhat I said I would do, work
hard, try to achieve, and ‘‘make something of
yourself.’’ I did that. I was, for example, the
first in my family (stemming from immi-
grants from Europe) to finish college by go-
ing to live on a residential campus.
Bob Sheldon: Where did you grow up?
Bruce Powers: In Chicago. TheWest Side,
but in the city.
Bob Sheldon:Where did you go to school
for your elementary, junior high, and high
school?
Bruce Powers: In the Chicago Public
Schools, whichwere quite good at that time.
The high school was Austin, which is also
the neighborhood where I was raised.
Bob Sheldon:Did you have some favorite
courses in high school?
Bruce Powers: Yes, chemistry, which led
me to study chemistry in undergraduate
school, and for a master’s degree later on.
That was largely because of the influence
of a teacher, Mr. Wasserman, in high school
chemistry.
Bob Sheldon: How did you pick your
college?
Bruce Powers: Mainly because of low
cost, I went to the branch of the University
of Illinois in Chicago, which allowed me to
be a commuting student. It was nominally
a two-year institution leading to two subse-
quent years at the state university’s main
campus in Champaign, Illinois. In my case,
I bent it a little and did five semesters in Chi-
cago and three in Champaign. (By the way,
the Chicago campus then was at Navy Pier,
now a tourist site.)
Bob Sheldon: What was your major?
Chemistry?
Bruce Powers: Yes. Physical chemistry,
which led to the master’s degree in physical
chemistry from University of Chicago.
Bob Sheldon: So you finished your bach-
elor’s degree in Champaign?
Bruce Powers: Yes.
Bob Sheldon: What year did you finish?
Bruce Powers: 1960.
Bob Sheldon: Did you go directly for
your master’s?
Bruce Powers: I did, finishing in 1961.
Bob Sheldon:Did you have towrite a the-
sis, or was it mostly coursework?
Bruce Powers: It wasmostly coursework,
but I had an arrangement with Professor
Ole Kleppa, and he and I published a couple
of papers together. So that substituted for
a thesis.
Bob Sheldon:Whatwere those papers on?
Bruce Powers: They were on the volume
change on mixing of liquefied halide salts.
Bob Sheldon: What kind of job did you
look for after you finished your master’s?
Bruce Powers:Well, mainly in chemistry.
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arrangements where potential employers would
come to campus and seek out students; I had
no experience in this sort of thing. So I picked
the first outfit coming to the campus for inter-
views simply to rehearse, to be better at this skill.
It turned out to be the Operations Evaluation
Group (OEG) at MIT, with a Navy connection,
and that worked out to be my career choice. My
interviewer was a fellow named Jim Hibarger,
who was the recruiter for OEG at that time.
Bob Sheldon: Where was your office when
you worked for OEG?
Bruce Powers:At first, in the Pentagon, start-
ing in mid-1961. After a year, CNAwas formed.
When CNAwas formed, we moved to offices in
the Rosslyn section of Arlington, Virginia.
Bob Sheldon: What kind of projects did you
work on initially?
Bruce Powers:At first, radar flooding in anti-
submarine warfare (ASW). The notion was that
diesel submarines in those days, in the hands of
some potential enemies, had to come up for air
to run their diesel engines, to charge their batter-
ies. Snorkels that stuck up out of the water were
vulnerable to detection by radar—but less so
than if the sub surfaced. The idea was that aerial
radars, which would propagate their radar sig-
nals to be detected by the submarines, and if
we kept our airborne radars on continuously,
the idea was that the submarines would be
forced to wait for recharging of their batteries,
and thus they’d get in a precarious position.
Forced to stay near the surface, they’d be easier
to detect with other sensors—and thus take out
when the time came.
Bob Sheldon: Who did you work with there
in OEG?
Bruce Powers: Many people, but my solid
mentor in those days was Erv Kapos, FS. Erv
later rose to become director of OEG, but he
was a keymentor to mewhen I was very young.
Bob Sheldon: I know OEG sponsored some
classes for their folks. Did you take any classes
at OEG?
Bruce Powers: I took a few courses to brush
up my skills in operations research (OR) in the
early days, because I was a chemist and not re-
ally well trained in OR in those days. Back
around 1960 there weren’t degrees given in
OR, so people were drafted to do it from other
professions, and that was the case for me. So I
picked up courses in statistics and so forth from
George Washington University (GWU) and
other local universities.
Then, about 10 years later, I took advantage
of a really good deal that CNA offered that they
called academic leave, which is to take a sabbat-
ical at full pay, go back to campus, and I picked
up a master’s degree in industrial engineering
and operations research. I went back to Chicago
and got it at the Illinois Institute of Technology.
Bob Sheldon: How was the transition from
OEG to CNA for you?
Bruce Powers: It was okay, although a lot of
the older analysts—I was still a very young
guy then—were alarmed about the change from
MIT to the Franklin Institute as sponsor, as it
moved from OEG to CNA. And there was
a hearing on the Hill in those days about the
‘‘unwisdom’’ of this move. I went as a young
guy with some older guys who were greatly ex-
ercised about this change of sponsor. For the
first five years, CNA, in its initiation, was spon-
sored by the Franklin Institute.
Bob Sheldon: When it transitioned to CNA,
your offices were in Rosslyn. What part of
Rosslyn?
Bruce Powers: CNA moved into what had
been Capital Airlines offices in the Arlington
Towers complex. That complex is still there,
now known as River Place.
Bob Sheldon: Did you change the kinds of is-
sues youworkedonwhen it transitioned toCNA?
Bruce Powers:A little bit. By then, 1962, I was
preparing for my first field assignment, a really
important feature of OEG life. I was designated
to go off to Norfolk toworkwith theNavy there.
OEG’s culture has older analysts looking after
the younger.
Bob Sheldon: So you felt well-prepared when
you went to Norfolk?
Bruce Powers: Yes, I did.
Bob Sheldon: Transition to Norfolk. Did you
move there physically and set up a household?
Bruce Powers: I did. I was a bachelor at that
point, although I married while in Norfolk on
that first field assignment. My bride, Phyllis,
coming from Chicago, joined me there in 1963.
I had met Phyllis when we were students at
the University of Illinois in Chicago.
Bob Sheldon: What kind of work did you do
there on your field assignment?
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Bruce Powers: It was the Operational Test
and Evaluation Force of the Navy. Their job
was to test gear that had been designated for po-
tential procurement by the Navy before it got
into the hands of fleet sailors, and see whether
in controlled tests the equipment performed
up to snuff.
Bob Sheldon: Was that test out at sea?
Bruce Powers: Sometimes at sea. Sometimes
in more controlled conditions ashore, on instru-
mented ranges, although instrumented ranges
in those days were very primitive compared to
now. Virtually no computers existed.
Bob Sheldon:What was your role in the test?
Did you set up the test design matrix and collect
data?
Bruce Powers: All of the above.
Bob Sheldon: Were there any findings from
your tests that surprised you?
Bruce Powers: Evaluating tests with a focus
on sample size changed the results and our con-
fidence in them.
Bob Sheldon: What year did you move to
Norfolk?
Bruce Powers: 1963. And I was there all that
year.
Bob Sheldon: What projects did you work
on? What specific systems did you test?
Bruce Powers: It was generally antisubmarine
things, but also attacking surface and air targets.
There were squadrons that were part of the Op-
erational Test and Evaluation Force—for exam-
ple, VX1, VX4, and VX5. The X designated test,
and each of these had different missions. VX1
did ASW. VX4 did air-to-air warfare. VX5 did
air-to-surface warfare. I worked on projects in
all those designated areas.
Bob Sheldon:When youwere doing the tests,
did you go out to sea or up in the air with them
while they were testing?
Bruce Powers: Sometimes.
Bob Sheldon: Did you get to know some of
the Navy operators?
Bruce Powers: I did, some of whom I still
knew later in my career, because they got pro-
moted to admiral and so forth, and opened
doors for me as the years went on.
Bob Sheldon: Was your field assignment
a fixed one-year tour?
Bruce Powers: Generally, they were one year.
There were some exceptions to that, but generally,
you went off expecting it to be one year, and knew
that. That provided special energy to your activi-
ties, because you needed to ingratiate yourself so-
cially with the headquarters command where
you were and then get some work done in that
short available time, andpersuadepeople that they
should listen to the results, all in the space of a year
or so. So you had to keep working fast.
Bob Sheldon: Then from Norfolk, where did
you go?
Bruce Powers: I headed to Quantico in 1964
to work with theMarines for two years. In those
days, the Landing Force Development Center
was in Quantico for the Marines, and it was
much like the Navy’s Test and Evaluation Force.
It looked at new gear before it was put in the
hands of the Fleet Marine Forces. It was headed
by a famous Brigadier General, Lew Walt, who
later became the Assistant Commandant.
Bob Sheldon: What kinds of systems were
you testing for the Marines?
Bruce Powers: Principally for me, it was heli-
copters and ship-to-shore landings, and I partic-
ipated in a collection of data in exercises that
included the first multiship helicopter ship-to-
shore landings. LPH (Landing PlatformHelicop-
ter) was a new class of ships at that time. Initially,
LPHs were converted old aircraft carriers. But in
the early 1960s, theywere commissioned as ships
of their own class, USS Iwo Jima class. They were
smallish flat tops designed for helicopter ship-to-
shore landings.
Bob Sheldon: Where were the tests done? At
Quantico or at Lejeune?
Bruce Powers: They were typically done at
Lejeune, and offshore. The helicopters were
based at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS)
New River, North Carolina. MAG26 was the
air group at that time that did the job. We also
had a major exercise that went over to Spain
to conduct landings, and this was the first
division-sized landing since World War II.
The commander of the operationwas a three-star
admiral, John McCain Jr., who was Senator John
McCain’s father.
Bob Sheldon:What part of Spain did they do
the landing test in?
Bruce Powers:NearRota.Adivision andwing
were landed there, and this included the use of
three LPHs. My job was to design experiments,
collect data, and so forth, on the operations of
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the helicopters and ship-to-shore work, and then
pull together the results, and evaluate the perfor-
mance of helicopters in these landings for Vice
Admiral McCain and, of course, his subordinate
Marine commanders.
Bob Sheldon:How long did you stay in Spain
doing the test?
Bruce Powers: It was a seven-week exercise,
including the transits both ways across the At-
lantic. The operations, the landings, were about
ten days.
Bob Sheldon: Did you work with any of the
Spanish counterparts in their military forces?
Bruce Powers: There were a few Spaniards
who came out as observers to see what we were
doing, but the Spaniards didn’t use helicopters
for ship-to-shore landing in those days, so they
were simply there to see what we were doing.
Bob Sheldon:Howmany years did you work
with the Marines?
Bruce Powers: Two years. All of 1964 and all
of 1965.
Bob Sheldon: Were there any other notable
projects you worked on there?
Bruce Powers: Yes. We evaluated the Stoner
rifle, which was a candidate that the Marines
had at that time for incorporation into their
forces. I took rifle training for that purpose,
learned to lie in the dirt and steady my gaze
and so forth. I actually earned a marksman’s
medal while doing such training and enjoyed
that a great deal.
Bob Sheldon: So ‘‘Every Marine a rifleman’’
and even ‘‘Every analyst a rifleman.’’
Bruce Powers: Sometimes.
Bob Sheldon: Were there any interesting re-
sults from that rifle test?
Bruce Powers: There were. The Stoner was
promoted by a lot of people inside and outside
the Marine Corps, but didn’t make the cut in
this case. The Army ran a separate evaluation.
The evaluations said that the alternative was
better, so the Stoner was put aside.
Bob Sheldon: What was the alternative?
Bruce Powers: The M16.
Bob Sheldon:Howwas it as an analyst work-
ing with the Marine Corps, compared to work-
ing with the Navy in Norfolk?
Bruce Powers:Therewere some important dif-
ferences. TheMarines were a little less used to ci-
vilians being around. For example, in the social
directory, in the Marine Corps, the officers were
clumped in one area, then the enlisted and the ci-
vilians last. In the Navy, it tended to be the offi-
cers first, civilians next, and enlisted last; which
told you something about how theMarine Corps
valued its uniformedpeople. Itwas great to be as-
sociated with people then in the Marine Corps
who had such great esprit and regard for each
other, and I shared it.
Bob Sheldon: Then from Quantico, where to
next?
Bruce Powers: By now, the VietnamWar had
heated up, and as was the case for CNA and
OEG over the years before, it modified its distri-
bution of analysts to be able to do combat anal-
ysis. So in 1966 I headed to Pacific Fleet
headquarters at Pearl Harbor to help fill out
a small team of analysts there that was going
to work on Vietnam War combat operations. I
ended up being a member of a team of four,
led initially by George Haering, and later by
Erv Kapos.
Bob Sheldon:What kind of projects or studies
did you work on there?
Bruce Powers: In my case, two—rescue of
downed aviators in combat and air-to-air
combat.
Bob Sheldon: What aspects of air-to-air com-
bat did you study?
Bruce Powers: The first attacks by MIGs from
North Vietnam against Navy air forces came in
early 1966, when I happened to be aboard a car-
rier, USS Hancock, that was flying F8s that mixed
it up with those MIGs. I debriefed the participat-
ing pilots when they returned to the carrier. That
grew like topsy and became a large project, to
evaluate our performance in air-to-air combat—
Navy and Marines and Air Force.
Bob Sheldon:What findings came out of that
study?
Bruce Powers: What was new to air-to-air
combat in that war were air-to-air missiles, Side-
winders and Sparrows. It was important to view
this campaign appropriately, because youwould
think the first kinds of measures of effectiveness
(MOEs) that made sense for air-to-air combat,
such as exchange ratios, would be the appropri-
ate way to view this conflict. But that wasn’t ac-
tually right, and it took a while to understand
this correctly. Analysts helped a lot to reveal
what were the appropriate measures for combat
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performance. Because in this case, the air-to-air
campaign was supportive to the air-to-ground
campaign.
The air-to-ground campaign was called
Rolling Thunder in those days. And the prob-
lem was that that the small North Vietnamese
Air Force was coming up to hound and harass
our bombing aircraft as they would approach
their targets. Unfortunately from our side, the
arrival times of our aircraft, both Navy and
Air Force, over targets in Route Package Six,
North Vietnam, were predictable. This was be-
cause there was a fight going on between the
Navy and Air Force over sortie rates, because
McNamara back in Washington wanted to em-
phasize all sorts of numericals. Sortie rates were
one of the things that we measured extensively,
because of the competition between the Services
to do more of this. The way in which you oper-
ate bases to gain more sorties over the course of
a month meant the arrival times over targets in
North Vietnam were predictable to the North
Vietnamese. So they could hold back with their
small air force, wait for us to come, and chal-
lenge us when we did, which they knew well
in advance. (Soviet ‘‘fishing boats’’ were near
our aircraft carriers.)
With their small air force, they were achiev-
ing some effects and getting us sometimes to jet-
tison our bomb loads. In those days F4s, F8s,
and so forth, were capable of both air-to-air
and air-to-surface combat. If they were carrying
bombs, to jettison them made them better
fighters should the aerial engagement turn into
a shooting encounter, as it sometimes did, al-
though I should add that air-to-air encounters
were rare, because the North Vietnamese had
a small air force and not much experience in us-
ing it, so it didn’t initiate frequently or press
when they did.
But the true MOE of a campaign, viewing
air-to-air work as a supportive activity of the
air-to-ground campaign, was to see how much
the presence of the North Vietnamese Air Force
airborne aircraft caused us to divert sorties from
air-to-ground bombing to air-to-air patrol in-
stead. Early in that campaign, at times, but not
on average, the rate at which US aircraft leaving
their bases were diverted to combat air patrol
armed with air-to-air missiles reached 30 per-
cent. But, more regularly, it was 10 or 15 percent.
So the true MOE, and it took a while to fig-
ure all this out, was the rate at which the North
Vietnamese with their small air force caused us
to divert our missions away from bombing,
which was the principal reason for being there,
to air-to-air patrol, which had no direct effect on
the targets on the ground.
Bob Sheldon: When you were at CINC-
PACFLT (Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet)
in Hawaii, did you spend much of your time in
theater in Vietnam?
Bruce Powers:Yes. The routinewas that there
were four of us analysts from OEG working at
CINCPACFLT headquarters in 1966. We’d
spend six weeks each forward in the combat
zone—generally on aircraft carriers. There were
other OEG people working aboard ships in the
combat theater all the time. Butwewere in effect
a team of augmentees, providing one man con-
tinuously forward in the combat theater out of
the four inHawaii, so every sixweekswewould
change, and every six months, each one of the
four of us would go forward. So out of the team
of four in Hawaii, one was deployed forward
continuously.
Bob Sheldon:Howwas the data capture from
debriefing fighter pilots and finding things out?
Bruce Powers: When you could, you would
speak personally with the air crews, sitting in
the intelligence debrief that occurred routinely,
and then collecting more data from the partici-
pating air crews. As the air-to-air campaign
evolved, so did analysis of it. Analysis focused
on the performance, for example, of the new
air-to-air missiles, which had been developed
in the fifties and nowused in combat for the first
time in the sixties.
Interviews with individual pilots were fol-
lowed after a while by data collection forms de-
veloped to be sure the right kinds of questions
were captured in each interview.
Bob Sheldon:Howmuch time did you spend
at CINCPACFLT?
Bruce Powers: About 20 months, including
the work forward in the combat zone.
Bob Sheldon: So you’d go for six weeks to
Vietnam, and then come back to Hawaii for —
Bruce Powers: Forwhat turned out to be three
times six weeks, and back to the combat theater.
Let me go on and mention a little, if I could,
about the work on rescuing downed aviators,
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because that was important also in 1966–1967.
Most aerial bombing campaigns don’t have ex-
plicit provision beforehand for rescuing downed
aviators, so it’s an ad hoc activity. There aren’t
squadrons designated to do it before the combat
occurs. But flexible forces can put together the
wherewithal to be able to do it, and that’s what
occurred in the Vietnam War.
It was quickly learned by combat com-
manders, and particularly the aviation squad-
rons that participated in the bombing, that if
your aircraft was damaged over North Viet-
namese targets, if you could get to the sea before
you ejected from your aircraft, the chances of
your being rescued went way up, from roughly
10 percent when downed on land to roughly
90 percent. So of course, the aviators tried hard
to reach the sea indamagedaircraft, but for ahand-
ful, they weren’t able to get out over the sea with
their aircraft, and had to eject, and in some cases,
such as Senator McCain, were captured and en-
dured a long imprisonment as a result.
Procedures were developed and communi-
cations techniques refined to be able to be able
to get to downed aviators quicker by the rescu-
ing forces, generally helicopters based aboard
ships operating in the Tonkin Gulf. A true anal-
ysis of the data that was generated by this found
some difficulties with communications delays
and thus delays in triggering aircraft that would
go off and conduct the rescues. These delays
were analyzed by me and other people in the
theater at the time, to make rescue more effec-
tive. The reasons that rescues should bemore ef-
fective were obvious. You of course want to
keep people safely out of enemy hands, and
the investment in skilled air crews to get them
able to do this is quite a lot, and youwant to res-
cue as many people as you can to get them back
in operations rather than start from zero to train
the people to replace them.
So for all these reasons, it was wise to rescue
as many downed air crews as could be, and the
rescue ratewent up as these procedureswere re-
fined. Analysis helped a lot to make it happen.
Bob Sheldon:Can you point to a couple of fac-
tors that impacted the effectiveness of rescues?
Bruce Powers: The principal difficulty was
communications delays, and getting rescue peo-
ple aware that their help would be needed, be-
cause vulnerable helicopters that would affect
the rescues had to make approaches to pick-up
sites involving risk, particularly exposure to en-
emy fire. So picking the appropriate path to the
site of downed aviators was key. Signals would
be needed from aviators who had been ejected
from their aircraft by their choice, and now com-
municating by radio. They had to get word to
the rescue crews about where they would be
available for pickup. Measuring those times
was critical to understandingwhat the actual se-
quence was in alerting rescue air crews to come
in and do that job.
So the rate of pickups rose. Analysis of com-
munication means and delays turned out to be
quite effective in increasing the rescue rate.
Bob Sheldon:Were there any other highlights
of your time in Vietnam and Hawaii?
Bruce Powers: After I left CINCPACFLT late
in 1967, I returned to CNA headquarters, where
Erv Kapos was the leader of a larger entity back
there called the Southeast Asia Combat Analy-
sis Division of OEG, which consisted of a few
teams of people, all of whom were working on
analyzing Vietnam data, which by now was
pouring out of the theater in huge volumes. Go-
ing back to what you asked earlier about how
data was collected on combat performance,
there were lots of routine reports generated by
operators in the Vietnam War. They were called
op reps for operations reports. They were mes-
sage reports of what people had been doing
on their various missions, aviation and other,
in the combat theater. And this was getting to
be quite a voluminous collection of reports on
combat. Analysis of it was the job of many peo-
ple back in Washington, but among them was
this arm of CNA, OEG, that Erv headed, and I
became part of that. That went on for a couple
of years before my next field assignment.
Even though we’ve been talking about my
combat analyses, I’d like to put it in a larger
context. Combat with smaller nations occurred
during the Cold War, but combat with the
USSR was averted. Managing competition
with the USSR during the Cold War while
averting superpower combat called for decades-
long patience and skill. I like to think I was
a participant in that, and even that usable com-
bat analysis helped.
Bob Sheldon: What was your next field
assignment?
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Bruce Powers: The next one was in the Sixth
Fleet in the Mediterranean. That started in the
spring of 1969. The Mediterranean was not at
war, so there were other things to do there.
One of the principal details of life in the Medi-
terranean was the Soviet Navy. There were reg-
ular interactions between the Sixth Fleet and the
Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean. The Sixth
Fleet had about 50 ships, and the Soviet Navy
had about 25 ships in the Mediterranean, and
there were ongoing interactions, including with
Soviet submarines. In the Cold War setting, the
Sixth Fleet and its NATO partners tried to detect
the Soviet subs. In the ColdWar, the interactions
went up through the level of detection, but of
course, stopped there.
The Soviet fleet was showing increasing op-
erational capabilities in its surface forces and its
submarine forces. The Soviets kept in the Med-
iterranean 10 to 15 submarines in those days,
and they gave us constant headaches about their
whereabouts and potential activities.
So detecting Soviet submarines was one of
the major operational activities in the Mediter-
ranean at that time, and I turned analysis to that
problem. Regular reports were generated about
intelligence and operational detections of sub-
marines. Analyzing that was an important part
of what I did. I actually did more of it later,
when Iworked in a subsequent field assignment
at CINCUSNAVEUR (Commander in Chief, US
Naval Forces, Europe)Headquarters in London,
in 1974–1975.
There also were in those 1969–1970 Sixth
Fleet days regular Soviet overflights of the US
naval forces, because the Soviets had Badgers
based in Egypt in those days, and some longer
range aircraft (Bears) that came out from the So-
viet Union and flew down the Atlantic into the
Mediterranean occasionally. These overflights
of US Navy ships led the CNO (Chief of Naval
Operations) of the time, Admiral Moorer, to
say that he didn’t want his aircraft carriers any-
where in the world to have a Soviet aircraft fly
within 100 miles of the carrier without escort
by an aircraft from the carrier.
It was clear pretty quickly that this stricture,
this goal by the CNO, was not being achieved.
All too often, somebody would look up from
the flight deck and say, ‘‘What the heck is that?’’
and itwas a Soviet aircraft flyingover that nobody
had detected. So I took this on as an analysis proj-
ect. My work yielded improvements in the Sixth
Fleet’s performance with its carrier-based fighter
intercepts.
Bob Sheldon: Where were you based there?
Bruce Powers: I was living in Gaeta, Italy,
working aboard the Sixth Fleet flagship, which
was the USS Little Rock. (She’s now a museum
in Buffalo, New York.) The Little Rock was the
flagship for the Sixth Fleet commander, and
she would stay in port for about ten days in
Gaeta, and go off, visit some other port or two,
partly to show the American diplomatic flag
during that time. She very occasionally would
operate. But generally, being a flagship, it went
where it was told and took the Sixth Fleet com-
mander where he wanted to go.
Bob Sheldon: Did you like working aboard
a ship as compared to being a landlubber?
Bruce Powers: I did. I enjoyed it a lot. It yield-
ed very close-knit social interactions with the
staff on board. My Sixth Fleet commander had
a staff of about 35 officers and one civilian,
me, and we got to know each other extremely
well, because shipboard life, even in peacetime
there in the Mediterranean, meant that you
worked very hard together when at sea and
played very hard when ashore. Friendships
built this way led later to attending each other’s
children’s weddings, etc.
Bob Sheldon: From the Med, you went back
to CNA?
Bruce Powers: Yes. I did return to CNA, and
was there for four years before heading off for
a year in London at CINCUSNAVEUR. During
the four years, I went back to school for a year
on CNA’s academic leave program in Chicago.
So I picked upmy degree in industrial engineer-
ing in 1971 just after Gaeta, and then returned to
CNA headquarters.
At CNA headquarters there was a signifi-
cant initiative to try to get people with field ex-
perience, of which I now had some under my
belt, to work on the future planning problems
of other parts of CNA that were concerned with
cost effectiveness and other kinds of analyses
that weren’t so focused on operations. I did
a lot of that before returning toOEG itself as a di-
vision director in 1973, because a new director
of OEG, Dan Rathbun, was brought in. He had
worked in OSD PA&E (Office of the Secretary
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of Defense ProgramAnalysis & Evaluation) and
other places. Dan didn’t have any experience
with OEG, so he needed somebody who had
some to help him out. That’s why I was brought
in as a division director.
Bob Sheldon: You now have your master’s
degree in industrial engineering. Did you take
mostly OR courses?
Bruce Powers: Virtually all, outside of a cou-
ple of rudimentary engineering courses.
Bob Sheldon: What kind of projects did you
work on?
Bruce Powers: It was running the field pro-
gram in my case. OEG had digested something
called the Tactical Analysis Groups shortly be-
fore I returned in 1973. Erv Kapos was director
of OEG, and Rathbun replaced Erv. The Tactical
Analysis Groups came into OEG without any
additional supporting structure at OEG head-
quarters. It used to be in OEG that the rotation
cycle for field assignments in the fleet had a pe-
riod of three years: one out, two back. The ratio
of people in Washington to people in the field
was thus something like two to one. Now, with
the digestion of the Tactical Analysis Groups,
which were out in the fleet, in the field, it was
one to one, and it was necessary to build up
the number of people at CNA headquarters
who would participate in the field program to
make the ratio more like the old two to one,
which was the classical way of doing this.
Because I hadworked in other parts of CNA
after my Sixth Fleet field assignment andmy ac-
ademic leave, I was instrumental in broadening
the field program’s appeal within CNA to other
parts of CNA besides OEG, and that’s largely
what I did for Dan Rathbun.
Bob Sheldon: How did you make it more
appealing?
Bruce Powers: Basically making people in
CNA, but outside its OEG component, aware
of the pleasures and effectiveness of working
with the fleet on OEG field assignments. There
were significant barriers within CNA in those
days, with OEG and its field program being sep-
arate and apart from the rest of CNA. Commu-
nications across those barriers was imperfect
and needed to be accomplished, and I was in-
strumental in that.
Bob Sheldon:Was that an easy sale? Did you
have an easy time recruiting?
Bruce Powers: The low hanging fruit came
easily, yes. About 15 people readily signed on
to participate in the field program, but the next
15 or 20 were much harder. So the sale became
much more difficult to achieve.
Bob Sheldon: What other kinds of projects
did you work on at CNA at the time?
Bruce Powers: After a year or so of this, Dan
Rathbun moved on, and Phil DePoy became the
director of OEG. Phil didn’t need my kind of
help. He didn’t need a guy who knew about
OEG, because he knew all about it himself. He
was even more experienced than I, including
on field assignments. An opportunity opened
up for the assignment in London, and I opted
to go off to the field once again in 1974, to work
for the four-star for the Navy in Europe. He was
called CINCUSNAVEUR, with headquarters in
London. The four-star CINC in those days was
Hal Shear, who later became the Vice Chief of
Naval Operations. So I had a chance to live in
London for a year in 1974–1975.
Bob Sheldon: Did you take your family over
to London?
Bruce Powers: I did. I lived outside London
and commuted by train. I lived in a town called
DenhamVillage, and it was about 20 miles from
downtown London.
Bob Sheldon: What kind of projects did you
work on there?
Bruce Powers: Almost entirely ASW. I men-
tioned earlier that I started working on that in
the Mediterranean with the Sixth Fleet com-
mander, but the conditions for deep analysis
of antisubmarine data that was collected over
the course of the Cold War on the Sixth Fleet
staff weren’t very good, because of day-to-day
operational interruptions.
So I’m now working in the same chain of
command in London, where there were fewer
interruptions for operational considerations, and
I had the time to study this anti-submarine
data more carefully, and come to understand
which platforms and sensors were most effec-
tive in achieving detection of Soviet subs op-
erating in the Mediterranean. This analysis
yielded some quite useful results in figuring
out just which platform and sensors should
be procured for the future or assigned opera-
tionally in the short term, if that should be
required.
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Bob Sheldon: Since OEG has a history going
back to World War II on ASW, were you able
to draw on some of the insights that they gath-
ered during World War II with their analysis?
Bruce Powers: For sure. There is within OEG
a very careful effort to train young folks to un-
derstand what’s been accomplished in the past,
and guide them in the direction of data sources
that past antisubmarinework produced, includ-
ing in this case back to World War II. So even in
the ColdWar, as it stretched decades afterWorld
War II, we took advantage of that knowledge
and understanding, and this is achieved by the
older analysts in OEG guiding the younger ones
in the right direction.
Bob Sheldon: What kinds of new insights
were different from the old insights?
Bruce Powers:Nuclear-powered submarines
had come along for the Soviet forces, and detect-
ing them is quite different, the kinds of sensors
and training amongst our sonar and other
sailors to be able to do so. So capitalizing on
new technology was required to detect nuclear
submarines. Roughly five of them operated in
the Med in those days. It was quite different
from classical radar and acoustic techniques
that had been used for the snorkeling diesel sub-
marines in World War II.
Bob Sheldon: Did you go out to sea on a
submarine?
Bruce Powers: I didn’t go out to sea, not
when I was working in Sixth Fleet or later at
CINCUSNAVEUR. When I was new in OEG, I
spent a week on a sub. I got a feel for what op-
erations on a submarine were like, and then it
was a diesel submarine. I’ve never been at sea
aboard a nuclear submarine even to this day.
Bob Sheldon: Did you get to travel around
Europe, outside of London?
Bruce Powers: We did travel on vacation
from work. I’d go to the Med for work and to
CINCEUR (Commander in Chief, European
Command) in Stuttgart.
Bob Sheldon: What year was that when you
came back from London?
Bruce Powers: 1975, when US forces finally
left Vietnam. Back at CNA, I was made Director
of Planning. This entailed design of CNA’s re-
search program, and tailoring it to Navy and
Marine Corps needs. Negotiating would be
with the staffs of sponsors in the headquarters
of each of the Navy and Marine Corps staff. So
I would work with the staffs of the Deputy
CNOs for aircraft, submarines, surface forces,
etc. This was from 1976 to 1978.
Bob Sheldon: Did you see their priorities
changing as the Vietnam War wrapped up?
Bruce Powers: I certainly did. There was
a need to refocus on procurement as combat op-
erations had shifted attention. Moneywas spent
replacing attrited aircraft, for example; this was
a significant activity for the Navy and Marine
Corps. And so was modernization of other
kinds of forces. With the war having ended,
there was both a drawdown in the size of the
Services, and at least as much in personnel, as
the shift to the all-volunteer force occurred with
its costlier uniformed people. This was coupled
with a need to look at procurement issues to be
sure that the right kind of replacement gear was
bought for the return of full focus to the Cold
War.
Bob Sheldon: How high on the food chain
were you in CNA?
Bruce Powers: I was in themanagement staff,
comprised of the top ten people there. But, to be
fair, I was about tenth in line.
Bob Sheldon: How long did you stay in that
job?
Bruce Powers: I was in that job for about two
and a half years, and then moved to RAND.
Bob Sheldon: What drove your move to
RAND?
Bruce Powers:A second invitation by RAND
to join their staff. I had turned the first one
down, because I had this new job doing the
planning for CNA, but I came to realize the in-
vitation from CNA’s President was hollow; he
wasn’t terribly interested in planning.
Bob Sheldon:Was it the RAND office in Santa
Monica or in DC?
Bruce Powers: I signed on anticipating going
to Santa Monica, but I started out in DC, and
ended up working there for two and a half
years.
Bob Sheldon: What kind of projects did
RAND have you work on?
Bruce Powers: There were a couple. One was
looking at the contribution of the land-based
Army radars to helping the Air Force sense ae-
rial targets that they might deal with in air com-
bat, and to some extent sea-based as well. And
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we also looked at large-scale floating air bases—
much larger than aircraft carriers. These large
platforms that might serve as floating air bases
were ideas and technology bubbling up from
the commercial world. They did not come to
pass. It turned out to be uncertain in operational
effectiveness, and very uncertain inmilitary cost.
Bob Sheldon: So your background in the
Navy helped you in your work for RAND for
the Air Force?
Bruce Powers: It certainly did. RAND was
doing some simulation of warfare on the joint
level, and wanted to incorporate naval forces
into it. So I was instrumental in standing up that
capability.
Bob Sheldon:Where was your RAND office?
Bruce Powers:Actually, in 1980 itwas 21st and
M Streets Northwest, downtown Washington.
Bob Sheldon: After RAND, where to next?
Bruce Powers: I went to IDA in 1981. The rea-
son I did that is a personal circumstance arose
where my wife’s mother took ill, and our plans
to move to Santa Monica couldn’t be achieved
because hermotherwas here nearDC. So instead
of heading to Santa Monica, I headed to IDA.
Bob Sheldon: There on Seminary Road?
Bruce Powers: Actually, I started out with
IDA in the Paper Clip Building near the Penta-
gon. Eads Street. But during the time I was at
IDA, which ended up being a year and a half,
we moved to Seminary Road.
Bob Sheldon:What projects did you work on
for IDA?
Bruce Powers: Two things for them. One was
electronic warfare, how to help OSD figure out
which electronic warfare should be procured.
The other was intratheater lift, again, working
for OSD. For combat campaigns of the future
that might arise, what sorts of lift within combat
theaters would be appropriate, how to capital-
ize on available infrastructure based in Europe
or places elsewhere, where it wasn’t very good,
where procured lift should be brought to the
theater, and so forth.
Bob Sheldon:Was that looking at the types of
lift?
Bruce Powers: It was; not only air but also
surface capacities.
Bob Sheldon:Youdidn’t havemuch of a logis-
tics background. Howdid you pick up the logis-
tics project?
Bruce Powers: I had learned to be flexible and
inquisitive from many prior experiences.
Bob Sheldon:CNAwould send you out to the
fleet to learn stuff. Did IDA send you out some-
place to learn about the tactical lift and intra-
theater lift?
Bruce Powers: They did not. In the case of
IDA, working for OSD headquarters staff in
the Pentagon, although some of the people pop-
ulating those staffs at the Pentagon were opera-
tionally astute or logistically astute, a detailed
knowledge of operations prized with OEG
wasn’t as required of you at such anOSD setting
in Washington. So you didn’t have to be as
deeply understanding, deeply capable, in oper-
ational details.
Bob Sheldon:Did you work with some of the
subject matter experts, some of the guys who
were the lifters?
Bruce Powers: I did. IDA took advantage of
resident consultants who generally had mili-
tary experience. I used them on my team, both
in electronic warfare and in intratheater lift
logistics.
Bob Sheldon: You spent a year and a half at
IDA. Where to after that?
Bruce Powers: Next, in 1982, was a think
tank that the Secretary of Defense, Cap Wein-
berger, kept at the National War College at
Fort McNair. This was a new initiative by
Weinberger to provide personal advice to
him on matters where he could let down his
hair. One of the problems for a Secretary of De-
fense is he seldom can say in public that he
doesn’t know much about that issue, so he
needed a sounding board, a group which
was knowledgeable about policy and opera-
tional issues, where he would let his hair
down and talk with us, and gain understand-
ing about topics where it was important that
he come to understand.
We would do research between monthly
meetings with Weinberger and the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs, and in those days it was Gen-
eral Vessey.
Bob Sheldon: So that was physically at Fort
McNair?
Bruce Powers: It was. We were an arm
housed in the National War College, but work-
ing for the Secretary of Defense and Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs. The President of the National
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Defense University, Lieutenant General Pustay
in those days, knew what we were doing, but
the connection was directly with the top guys
in the Pentagon.
Bob Sheldon: How large of a staff?
Bruce Powers: There were 10 of us there,
about half civilians, and an officer from each Ser-
vice, and led by civilians who had been knowl-
edgeable in analysis and strategy beforehand.
Bob Sheldon: What were the issues you
tackled?
Bruce Powers: There were questions then
about so-called horizontal escalation. Would it
be wise if the Soviets caused trouble in one the-
ater to cause them counter-trouble in another
theater? If so, which theater should we select
for initiating crises or even combat—should
they cause trouble, say, on the Central Front in
Europe? And what order of such campaigns
would be appropriate to initiate?
There were also issues of relations between
India and China, which were very frosty in those
days, and whether it would be appropriate to
take advantage of friends we had in Pakistan to
bring pressure against the Indians and/or the
Chinese to make them each behave.
It was political/military work, and quite in-
teresting and enjoyable for me, and the chance
to work directly with the Sec Def and Deputy
Sec Def, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
was great.
Bob Sheldon:How receptive wasWeinberger
to analytic advice?
Bruce Powers: He was. He was open-
minded, listened carefully, took advantage of
this group to not only serve as a sounding board
for him, but listened to its ideas, and encour-
aged us to think of fresh alternatives which he
then could capitalize on in his discussions with
other people. So it clicked.
Let me add an insight. Any Sec Def is very
busy. Demands on his time are substantial.
So, in Weinberger’s case, his Dep Sec, Frank
Carlucci, made it click by insuring we got on
Weinberger’s calendar monthly. Weinberger’s
two-star military assistant then, Colin Powell,
also was key.
Bob Sheldon: How long were you there at
NDU?
Bruce Powers: I worked there from 1983 to
1985, but during that time, as happens often,
the bureaucracy wore down the easy, open ac-
cess we had to Sec Def and the Chairman. As
time went on, the people in their staffs per-
suaded them that these outsiders weren’t
needed, and the staff could take care of the is-
sues. So the frequencywith which wemet them,
which was initially monthly, became quarterly,
and ultimately, turned off entirely.
Bob Sheldon: You were there from 1983 to
1985, during the Reagan administration. Did
you see any changes in emphasis over the
course of those three years?
Bruce Powers: Themost important thing that
was happening was the Reagan administration
was successful in getting Congress to increase
the Defense budget. Our joke then was that
Weinberger spent his days moving wheelbar-
rows of money from Capitol Hill to the Penta-
gon. After quite a lot of this, things began
settling down, and there were reports then of
excesses in procurement—$500 hammers and
expensive toilet seats and things like that. So
the Congress’s enthusiasm for up-ramped
funding for defense had dropped quite a lot
by the mid-1980s, and the ambitious plans set
by all the Services and OSD and so forth in the
early eighties were not being fostered any more
by Congress. So adjusting to sharply altered fis-
cal constraints was the major issue in the mid-
eighties. It tied the hands of all the people in
DoD (Department of Defense), including in
the military Services.
Bob Sheldon: After your three years there,
where to next?
Bruce Powers: I moved to the Pentagon in
1986 and joined the Naval Aviation part of the
CNO’s staff as the senior civilian working for
the three-starswhowere runningNavy andMa-
rine Corps aviation. That was comprehensive—
procurement of aircraft, their carriers, and
weapons training, maintenance, and all this
was done from Op-05, which is what the shop
was called that did this, and the code they
assigned me to was Op-05W, which had a long
title. (You’ll remember that in the DoD, the lon-
ger your title, the less important you are.) Mine
was Special Assistant for Technology, Analysis,
and Planning. Long enough.
Bob Sheldon: Was that in the Pentagon or in
the Navy Annex?
Bruce Powers: It was in the Pentagon.
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Bob Sheldon: What were the big issues of
importance?
Bruce Powers: The things that took up lots of
my time, particularly in the early days, were the
development of new aircraft. I came there in
1986, and the initiatives that had been cooked
off in the early Reagan time were now coming
to fruition, and new types of aircraft were be-
ing procured or planned for procurement for
the Navy, and this included the A12, the stealth
carrier-based bombing aircraft that was to re-
place the A6, and advanced variants of the
F14, and the V22 for the Marine Corps. And
there was a plan then for replacement for E2
aircraft on carriers, which was to be a sophisti-
cated command and control aircraft.
All these were percolating at the same time,
and my job was to facilitate the new aircraft
types and fit them into the Navy.
Bob Sheldon: How large was the staff you
worked with?
Bruce Powers: I had about 12 people working
for me, virtually all Naval officers—one or two
Marines included.
Bob Sheldon: Did you use any simulation
models or anything else to study the issues?
Bruce Powers:We did. We took advantage of
all kinds of analytical tools and techniques to try
to understand these issues of planning and tech-
nology better, and that included simulation, and
work by CNA and other think tanks, anything
we could get our hands on that would help us
do a better job of planning and monitoring the
development of the aircraft types, and seeing
to their appropriate use once in the fleet and
Marine forces.
Bob Sheldon: Did you use some of your old
contacts at CNA?
Bruce Powers: I certainly did. I tapped that all
the time to help me understand issues better. My
old friends at CNA were anxious to make in-
roads among Naval Aviation and have their
work exposed, so it was a mutually beneficial ar-
rangement. Similarly, I would invite in analysts
from industry, think tanks, universities, and gov-
ernment to flesh out and illuminate issues.
Bob Sheldon: You had some previous exper-
tise in studying air-to-air combat in Vietnam
and in the rescue of downed aviators in com-
bat. Was that outdated by then, or was it still
relevant?
Bruce Powers: Some of it was relevant. In
fact, later on inmy time at Op-05, I took on some
teaching at GWU, and some of the lessons from
that early combat analysis, quite early in my ca-
reer, turned out to be valuable as instruction on
doing analysis for operating forces.
Bob Sheldon: How was it working futuristic
programs as compared to working with real
data?
Bruce Powers: It was possible to link some.
Aircraft that existed only on paper required
guesswork about performance. Because I
had come to understand aircraft in either op-
erational test circumstances or combat, what-
ever was available from that that could
potentially be used. And now it was estimat-
ing performance in the future. Where I could,
I would extrapolate from performance as actu-
ally measured. But dealing with guesswork
isn’t as confidence-inducing as measuring cur-
rent operational performance. Still, it had to be
done.
Bob Sheldon: How long did you spend at
OpNav (Office of the Chief ofNavalOperations)?
Bruce Powers: I spent 16 years, but the first
nine of those were in Op-05. Then I moved to
the Assessment Division, the successor to the
old Op-96. Over the course of seven years there,
I ran three branches successively.
Bob Sheldon: So you evolved from one job to
another?
Bruce Powers: Yes, always bouncing. But my
longest—nine years at one place—was at Naval
Aviation (Op-05) in OpNav.
Bob Sheldon:Howmany analysts were in the
Assessment Division?
Bruce Powers: It started out as about 75 peo-
ple, both uniformed and civilian. It was basi-
cally the analytical arm of OpNav. It evolved
from its earlier days when it did cost effective-
ness and other kinds of analyses. It didn’t do
very well during the Lehman era as Sec Nav,
and he cut it back and reduced its size, and re-
duced its mission.
But after Lehman left the Sec Nav job, it was
restored to some of its earlier health. And I
moved to N81 because of the CNO at the time.
Boorda was his name. He said he wanted to re-
vitalize N81 and turn it back into what Op 96
had been earlier. So to me, that was the ticket—a
chance to work for the CNO directly.
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Bob Sheldon: How were analytic issues
approached there as compared to at CNA and
OEG?
Bruce Powers: The issues for OpNav were
much more focused on planning future forces
than at particularly the OEG portion of CNA,
which is focused on the performance of current
forces. So issues in OpNav were pointed at
which mix of forces were most appropriate for
procurement.
In N81, we were focused on the first ‘‘P’’ in
PPBS (Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
System). That was like the ‘‘architect’’ phase of
building a home. The perspective was often
that of the whole Navy, and it was always
cost-constrained. So proposals for inclusion of
additional ships or aircraft types had to be ac-
companied by trade-offs, or off-sets, of equal
cost. Skilled teams of analysts, military and
civilian, worked on these trade-off issues.
Most of the officers had a master’s degree
in OR from the Naval Postgraduate School
(NPS) in Monterey (where I later taught OR).
When I joined N81 in 1994, I was very for-
tunate to have as my deputy Captain Trip
Barber. Trip was and is a standout analyst also
skilled at getting the best analysis from subor-
dinate officers on tough issues of Navy design.
N81 was also lucky to have a full-time CNA
analyst assigned. That billet was filled by
a string of topnotch CNAveterans then. When
I started in 1994, the CNA analyst assigned
was George Akst, and his office was in my
branch, N812.
Bob Sheldon: So you were in N81, OpNav,
with the aftereffects of Desert Storm. How did
you see that?
Bruce Powers:We capitalized a lot on combat
performance and behavior as revealed in Desert
Storm. Though the campaign was brief, only
seven weeks for the aviation part of it, we
learned a great deal about performance fromNa-
val and other forces, and drew on that in our
planning for future forces, not only against sur-
face targets, but some air-to-air combat in the
Desert Storm war, and of course, a significant lo-
gistics effort to get forces over there and keep
them sustained. The Navy assigned six aircraft
carrier battle groups and other forces to that cam-
paign. By the time the five-month build-up pe-
riod had ended, a big chunk of DoD was there.
Bob Sheldon: This was also the post-Cold
War era. How did that change your analytic
emphasis?
Bruce Powers: When Les Aspin became the
Secretary of Defense in 1993, he had a notion
that planning for a big worldwide war with
the Soviets should be replaced for planning pur-
poses withmedium-sized conflicts in theaters—
what were called major regional conflicts. This
scaled down some the nature of the planning—
from, if you will, dealing with one big dragon
to now a bunch of snakes in individual the-
aters. Our plan for the future adapted to that
in DoD in response to what Aspin called for
in a ‘‘Bottom-Up Review.’’ Aspin’s Bottom-Up
Review was mimicked in later Quadrennial
Defense Reviews (QDRs) for future defense
planning.
Bob Sheldon: The 1990s also brought a lot
more computers into the Pentagon, or at least
desktop computers and the Internet. How did
you see the changes in the analytic approaches
with the proliferation of desktop computers
and Internet?
Bruce Powers: This permitted decentralized
analytical work. No longer did people go to
the machines, but the machines were in the
hands of people. So it was possible to develop
and assign to individuals smaller, more bite-
sized analytical work, which they could pursue
on their own with the machines available to
them. I think that worked out pretty well. Peo-
ple became individually more capable, and
therefore able to pursue, if you will, a larger
net analytical product with smaller pieces of
work being done by individuals. But the pieces
needed integration by managers such as Trip,
myself, and others.
It also enabled new analytical initiatives. In
my OpNav N812 branch, we stood up the first
joint campaign analysis capability in a Service
headquarters.
Bob Sheldon: Did you bring stuff into N81
from what you learned 20, 30 years earlier in
OEG?
Bruce Powers: I retained my reverence for
data and measuring operational performance,
and would use results of such measurements
whenever I could when planning future forces.
In fact, going back to the experience I described
when at CNA about the bridge between work
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that OEG had donewithin CNA tomeasure cur-
rent fleet performance and link it to future-force
work that the rest of CNA did, the key notion
there was to apply measurement of current op-
erational performance to future planning prob-
lems. CNA was substantially able to bridge
that gap by using people experienced with field
assignments in the fleet and sending such peo-
ple to work on future forces analysis.
Bob Sheldon: What did you do after your
16 years in OpNav?
Bruce Powers: I retired from full-time work in
2001, and shifted to part-time work that was al-
most all teaching, but some consulting. I retired
a month after 9/11, and was in the Pentagon
when the airplane hit the building.
Bob Sheldon: Which side of the Pentagon
were you on when the airplane hit?
Bruce Powers: I was 100 yards from where
the airplane hit the building, but fortunately,
not on the path that the airliner was on. It sliced
into the Pentagon from its outside edge, but I
was not on the path, so therefore not hurt, al-
though my office was beat up pretty badly in
the two days of firefighting that followed.
Bob Sheldon: What kind of courses did you
teach?
Bruce Powers: Analysis. Basically, I passed
on what I had learned over the years to younger
folks—graduate students. I did and do this in
two principal places. Over six winters, I went
to NPS to teach a course in campaign analysis
there. And, since 1993, I’ve taught analysis at
GWU. Once I retired from OpNav, I increased
my course load, and I continue teaching there
to this day.
Bob Sheldon: Letme back up to your involve-
ment in professional societies. Were you also in-
volved in the Operations Research Society of
America (ORSA)?
Bruce Powers: Much less in ORSA, al-
though I attended a couple of their meetings.
Most of my professional society activity was
with MORS, where I attended about one-third
of themeetings over the decades, and ledworking
groups (naval warfare and other kinds of analysis,
aviation) on maybe five to seven occasions.
Bob Sheldon:Whendidyoufirst go to aMORS
Symposium (MORSS)?
Bruce Powers: My first meetings were in the
1960s, when I was a quite young analyst, and
was guided to MORS by people like Erv Kapos,
my boss then.
Bob Sheldon: The working groups that you
led, were those at the annual symposium or at
the workshops?
Bruce Powers: Typically at annual symposia,
and they were, as I say, either on naval warfare
or aviation, and once even in command and
control.
Bob Sheldon: What kind of work did you
present at MORSS?
Bruce Powers: Work that I had done on, for
example, rescue of downed aviators, including
significant focus on communications. In that
case, it was very operationally focused, not tech-
nologically focused. So helping people under-
stand operational issues as revealed in combat
analysis in the case of downed aviators was
helpful to them, because they wanted to turn
technological tools to these problems of opera-
tional performance.
Bob Sheldon: What was your personal value
added for going to MORS?
Bruce Powers: Getting to know colleagues
and seeing how other people approached
problems helped me over my career. I don’t
bring preconceived notions about the right
tool to use on an analytical problem, and this
was inculcated in me as a youngster in OEG.
Fitting a tool to the problem is far better than
finding problems that fit your tools. I was on
a constant quest always to understand differ-
ent ways to analyze and solve problems. So de-
veloping my range of tools was a personal
quest of mine. MORS helped a lot with that.
And MORS’s classified setting increased the
aperture for that.
Bob Sheldon: Awrap-up question: what ad-
vice would you give to a young analyst on
how to become a better analyst?
Bruce Powers: It would be to come to under-
stand operations and do all you can to get out
where operating forces actually do their thing,
and measure performance. Examine operations
and especially combat carefully because the
data can be ambiguous. The rewards are lasting
from getting this right.
In the first 15 years of my career, I was very
fortunate to spend a total of two years working
aboard warships as a civilian analyst. There is
no substitute for such experience in the messy
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world of real operations and doing analysis in it.
Invaluable.
Mike Garrambone: How did your academic
background in chemistry help you as an
analyst?
Bruce Powers: Chemistry taught me the sci-
entific approach, and that is to be open-minded
and even-handed about the competing alter-
native solutions to your problem. It’s OK to
develop hypotheses, but data must bear them
out. Measuring performance and understand-
ing it will help you see what the right answer
is to selecting amongst competing alterna-
tives, and applying a reverence for data that
comes from chemistry experiments helps in
figuring out what military operational perfor-
mance is.
Mike Garrambone: You worked at various
levels—the tactical level, the operational level,
and you worked at the strategic level of analy-
sis. And you were able to transition and bring
insights from one level to the other. Can you talk
about that?
Bruce Powers: Starting out doing work at the
tactical level was crucial to my development as
an analyst, because I gained reverence for the
importance of data andmeasuring performance
before I did anything on a more speculative
level, so that as I moved later on to designing re-
search programs for analysis, and ultimately
advising the Secretary of Defense on the issues
that you might call strategic, I had this ground-
ing in the importance of actual measurement of
performance, and realized that when I was
speculating about the future, how uncertain
that was, and therefore transmitted my views
about that uncertainty to the consumers of my
work.
Mike Garrambone: Any parting shots or any
questions we should have asked?
Bruce Powers: I probably should elaborate
that in my time working in N81, the Navy’s
analysis shop, I also developed a capability
for joint campaign analysis by the forces of all
of DoD to illuminate issues for Navy planning.
Joint campaign analysis, which tapped the un-
derstanding available from all the Services and
all the analytical arms of the Services on perfor-
mance, so that we could stitch together ways in
which campaigns would evolve, and examine
the performance of naval systems in that con-
text. And the broader context brought much
better understanding of what the appropriate
procurement choices would be for the Navy
in the development of forces it would use in
such campaigns. That capability exists to this
day, the joint campaign analysis. And it’s
why I ended up teaching it later in Monterey
at NPS.
As I matured as an analyst, I took more
of a mentoring role. Bringing along younger
analysts—both uniformed and civilian—grew
increasingly rewarding and, I hope, produc-
tive. For civilians I mentored, this was impor-
tant. Civilians working in military-dominated
staffs don’t have the career development sup-
port that uniformed members do.
One last tip for analysts starting out: get to
be known early for a particular analysis or two
that you have done.
I loved my career, and would do it all over
again—for half the pay.
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